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What happens when regulators and the entities they 
regulate are both government agencies? Leading theories 
of regulation assume that governments regulate profit-
maximizing firms: governments set rules, to which firms 
respond rationally in ways that constrain their behavior. 
However, often the entities that governments regulate are 
other government agencies, which face very different 
compliance costs. 
Many regulatory policies—
especially health, safety, and 
environmental regulations—
apply to government agen-
cies as well as private firms. 
In the United States, tens of 
thousands of government 
agencies at local, state, and 
federal levels provide a diz-
zying array of functions that 
are subject to regulation just 
like their private sector 
counterparts. However, gov-
ernment agencies and pri-
vate firms confront different 
incentives and constraints in 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Compliance with US 
environmental regulations is 
poorer among government 
agencies than similar private 
firms.  
 
Environmental regulators 
respond to violations with less 
severe punishment against 
government agencies than 
against private firms.  
 
Since the root causes of those 
differences are essentially 
political, the most effective 
solutions are likely to be 
political as well. 
2 the regulatory arena. Regulatory theory pre-
dicts that firms respond to regulation by 
weighing the cost of compliance against the 
risk of sanction for violation. Firms comply 
with regulations when the risk of penalties 
outweighs the cost of compliance.1  
Unlike profit-maximizing firms, government 
agencies face contested, ambiguous missions 
and are politically constrained from raising 
revenue to meet regulatory requirements. At 
the same time, agencies do not face direct 
competition from other firms, rarely face 
elimination, and may have sympathetic po-
litical allies. Consequently, the regulator’s 
usual array of enforcement instruments 
(e.g., fines, fees, and licensure) may be po-
tent enough to alter behavior when the tar-
get is a private firm, but less effective when 
the regulated entity is a government agency.  
Conventional theories of regulation fit awk-
wardly when government agencies are the 
regulated entities for three broad reasons:  
 Government agencies rarely have any 
kind of profit incentives. Government 
managers are responsible to elected offi-
cials, voters, and professional peers, not 
shareholders. They must balance regula-
tory mandates against competing priori-
ties like equity, affordability, representa-
tiveness, and political responsiveness. 
 Private firms may pass the costs of regu-
latory compliance on to consumers with-
out serious threat to competitiveness, as 
long as other firms must also comply. 
Public agency managers must secure 
political support for the revenue increas-
es, capital investments, and increased 
operating expenditures that regulatory 
compliance requires.  
 Regulators are more limited in the pen-
alties that they can impose on public 
agencies. Imposing a fine on a public 
agency penalizes the same public that 
the regulator serves. Threatening to shut 
down a public agency is not realistic if 
the regulated agency is a monopoly pro-
vider of some essential service. The US 
Environmental Protection Agency could 
hardly threaten to put the US Navy out 
of business for violating environmental 
regulations. 
The ambiguity of agency goals and the diffi-
culty of punishing noncompliance make the 
regulation of public agencies inherently po-
litical. 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION  
US environmental policy provides an ideal 
example to illustrate differences in public 
and private regulation outcomes because 
public agencies and private firms provide 
similar services, confront similar regulatory 
obligations, and are sufficiently numerous to 
provide statistical traction. We studied two 
prominent US environmental programs: the 
 
Government managers 
are responsible to 
elected officials, voters, 
and professional peers, 
not shareholders 
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Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Safe Drinking 
Water Act (SDWA). Both programs are ad-
ministered by a single federal regulatory 
agency, the Environmental Protection Agen-
cy (EPA), and both regulate a large number 
of public agencies and private firms.  
EPA regulation data on the two programs 
provided consistent evidence that publicly-
owned facilities are more likely than similar 
privately-owned facilities to violate regula-
tory requirements under the CAA and 
SDWA. It also revealed a tendency for en-
forcement officials to impose less severe 
punishment on public agencies violating the 
CAA and SDWA compared to similarly non-
compliant private firms. We found the fol-
lowing results2 (also illustrated in Figure 1): 
 Public power plants and hospitals were 
on average 9% more likely to be out of 
compliance with Clean Air Act regula-
tions and 20% more likely to have com-
mitted high-priority violations. 
 Among violators of the Clean Air Act, 
public power plants and hospitals were 
1% less likely than private-sector viola-
tors to receive a punitive sanction and 
20% less likely to be fined. 
 Public water utilities had on average 
14% more Safe Drinking Water Act 
health violations and were 29% more 
likely to commit monitoring violations. 
 Among violators of the Safe Drinking 
Water Act standards, public water utili-
ties were 3% less likely than investor-
owned utilities to receive formal en-
forcement actions such as a citation and 
fine or administrative order. 
NARROWING THE DISPARITY 
It is not surprising that environmental poli-
cy implementation in the United States is 
uneven in ways that cause poorer compli-
ance and weaker enforcement among gov-
ernment agencies relative to private firms. It 
is exactly what regulation theories predict. 
The difficult question is what can be done to 
make government regulation of government 
entities more effective. 
Publicly-owned facilities 
are more likely than 
similar privately-owned 
facilities to violate 
regulatory requirements  
3 
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Figure 1: Percent Difference in Likelihood of 
Public vs. Similar Privately-Owned Facilities  
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Source: US EPA CAA data (as of August 2012), SDWA 
data (as of April 2014) and authors’ calculations  
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Solutions should address the extra challeng-
es that public administrators balance, and 
since the root causes of those differences are 
essentially political, the most effective solu-
tions are likely to be political as well. Poten-
tial responses could include subsidies for 
government compliance, stronger political 
leadership in regulated agencies, changes to 
regulator incentives, and privatization.  
Greater transparency about the associated 
costs and challenges of compliance and non-
compliance is also needed for both public 
and private entities. America’s principal en-
vironmental laws are meant to protect the 
public from environmental harms, no matter 
their source. Nature doesn’t discriminate 
between public and private sources of pollu-
tion, and neither should environmental reg-
ulations—after all, the health effects of pol-
lution are the same whether the source is a 
government agency or a private firm.  
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